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Recent work using the eye movement monitoring technique has demonstrated that
when people are engaged in thought they tend to disengage from the external world
by blinking or fixating on an empty portion of the visual field, such as a blank wall,
or out the window at the sky. This ‘looking at nothing’ behavior has been observed
during thinking that does not explicitly involve visual imagery (mind wandering, insight
in problem solving, memory encoding and search) and it is associated with reduced
analysis of the external visual environment. Thus, it appears to indicate (and likely
facilitate) a shift of attention from external to internal stimuli that benefits creativity and
problem solving by reducing the cognitive load and enhancing attention to internally
evolving activation. We briefly mention some possible reasons to collect eye movement
data in future studies of creativity.
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It has been said that the eyes are the windows on the soul. In this paper we will examine whether
the eyes are the windows to the mind. We will concentrate on eye movements and blinking, and
how they both reveal and influence creative thinking.
Anecdotally, when people are engaged in retrieving information from memory, imagining,
problem solving or thinking creatively, they often shift their gaze from the problem or from
other people toward an empty space or a blank wall. This was popularly understood to be a way
to disengage from distracting information so that one can concentrate on inner thoughts. The
artist Paul Gauguin described his necessity of disengaging from outside reality to enhance his
imagination and creativity in his famous quote ‘I shut my eyes in order to see.’
The connection between thinking and visual processes has a long history in psychology,
predating the development of eye tracking equipment and neuroimaging techniques. One of the
founders of psychology as a science, William James (1890), remarked on the connection between
eye movements and cognitive processes in his ‘Principles of Psychology’:
When I try to remember or reflect, the (eye) movements in question, instead of being directed toward
the periphery, seem to come from the periphery inward and feel like a sort of withdrawal from the
outer world. As far as I can detect, these feelings are due to an actual rolling outward and upward of
the eyeballs, such as I believe occurs in me in sleep, and is the exact opposite of their action in fixating
a physical thing. (http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/prin10.htm)
Clearly as early as 1890, when ‘Principles of Psychology’ was first published, psychologists had
noticed a possible relation between eye movements and cognition. During the first half of the
20th Century, Gestalt Psychologists suggested that there are many processes that are shared by
visual perception and problem solving. For example, perceptual organization that determinates
various aspects of vision, such as object recognition and depth perception have analogs (if not the
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same processes) in problem solving that lead to both difficulties
and to sudden insights. One of the key points of the Gestalt
principles of visual perception is that object recognition can
come suddenly and holistically, following a reorganization of
the visual elements into a new integrated whole. Analogously,
while engaged in a creative activity, or in problem solving, a new
idea or a new solution can arise suddenly and holistically from
a reinterpretation or reorganization of the problem elements.
Gestalt psychology faded with the cognitive revolution in the
1950s, largely due to its theories being more descriptive than
explanatory (Bruce et al., 1996), yet the similarities, at least at
a surface level, between visual and problem solving processes
had been established. In the second half of the 20th Century
non-Gestalt perception psychologists, most notably Rock (1983),
suggested that much of visual perception is, in fact, a form
of intelligent problem solving rather than merely the result of
automatic processes.
More recently, the Embodied Cognition movement has led
to increased interest in how cognitive processes and seemingly
non-cognitive body processes are linked. Embodied cognition is
the belief that cognitive processes and the body are not separate
but are linked at the most basic level. The connection between
thought and the body is bidirectional with thought influencing
and directing the states and actions of the body (e.g., Lakoff
and Johnson, 1980, 1999), and states and actions of the body
influencing and directing thought (e.g., Eerland et al., 2011).
Two fundamentals assumptions underlie the position we take
in this paper: The first is the evolutionary position that existing
structures and systems are not replaced by new ones, rather that
new ones are built on top of the existing ones (Jonides et al.,
2005), the second is that the connection between thought and the
body is bidirectional.
EYE MOVEMENTS AND MEMORY
Existing neural systems that enable search for information in
the visual environment may have given rise to neural systems
able to search for non-visual information stored in long-term
memory (Ehrlichman and Micic, 2012). The connection is
supported by the finding that when people search for (non-
visual) information in long-term memory they make multiple
eye movements analogous to those made when searching the
environment visually, and when they focus on information in
long-term memory they make very few eye movements just
as happens when people focus on an object in the visual
environment. Thus, mechanisms for internal attention may have
evolved from those already in place for attending to the external
world. In this theory Ehrlichman and Micic (2012) speculate
that internal thought processes are systematically related to
(non-visual) eye movements. More frequent movements of
the eyes are found when people are engaged in tasks that
require search of long-term memory than when they are
engaged in tasks that do not require long-term memory
search, even when the tasks do not seem to have any visual
component. In fact, Ehrlichman and Weinberger (1978) found
that participants were less likely to make eye movements
(were more likely to stare) when answering visuospatial
questions than when answering verbal questions. Bergstrom and
Hiscock (1988) found that differences in eye movements are
related to the memory demands of questions, and Glenberg
et al. (1998), found that when people try to respond to
difficult questions they avert their gaze from engaging visual
inputs.
LOOKING AT NOTHING OR AT OBJECTS
THAT AREN’T THERE
Hebb (1968) introduced the idea that imagining an object is
associated with the same eye-movement scan paths that would
be associated with actually viewing that object. He suggested
that eye movement during imagery has a functional role, to, as
in perception, put together and organize the ‘part images’ to
construct a complete visualized image. More recent empirical
evidence demonstrated that eye movements during imagery are
not random, but reflect the content of the imagined scene
(Brandt and Stark, 1997) therefore imagining any visual stimulus
triggers corresponding oculomotor responses as if thinking
of an object involves pretending to look at it. In a series
of studies, Spivey and Geng (2001) demonstrated how eye
movements mirror mental images. In two experiments (Spivey
and Geng, 2001) participants were instructed to look at a white
projection screen while (1) imagining (by listening to pre-
recorded instructions of specific directionality, i.e., rightward,
leftward, upward, and downward) or (2) recalling objects that
were not physically present on the display in what was called
the Hollywood squares paradigm; (Richardson and Spivey, 2000),
they were asked to recall a characteristic of one of the four
objects that was previously presented on the screen). Results of
the first experiment showed that participant’s eye movements
were biased toward the direction of the spatiotemporal imagery
in the scene description. Results of the second experiment
showed that participants were more likely to look at the
blank region of the screen where the missing object had been
presented, despite the fact that looking at the blank region
was not informative because there was no visual information
there to address the recall. The results have been replicated
even when participants were asked to relax and to close their
eyes while listening to the ten short stories (i.e., there were
no instructions to specifically imagine anything) (Spivey et al.,
2000).
Several cognitive-neuroscience models suggest memory
retrieval is based on the recreation of cortical processes that were
active at the time of the original experience (e.g., Marr, 1971;
Norman and O’Reilly, 2003). Indeed, it has been shown that
common neural systems are activated during initial perception
and later retrieval (e.g., Nyberg et al., 2000; Wheeler et al., 2000).
Brandt and Stark (1997) demonstrated that during recall of
picture or scenes participants’ eyes moved spontaneously and
the movements closely reflected the spatial relations and the
overall content of the imagined picture or scene. Johansson et al.
(2006) further investigated this phenomenon by comparing eye
movements in four conditions: (1) while participants listened
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to a spoken scene description and (2) when participants were
later retelling it from memory; (3) while studying a complex
picture visually, and (4) when they were later describing it from
memory. When participants were instructed to recall a visual
scene, previously presented either via a verbal description or
visual scene, the eye movements made during initial listening
or viewing spontaneously reappeared with recall of the scene.
This repetition of the eye movements made at encoding
occurred for participants both when they looked at a blank
white board and in conditions of complete darkness (see also
Ehrlichman and Barrett, 1983). Thus, remembering a visual
scene seems to involve the reinstatement of the visual processes
that were active during encoding. Johansson and Johansson
(2014) hypothesized that the probability of remembering should
improve when the visual processes engaged at retrieval overlap
with those engaged at encoding. Their results demonstrated
that spontaneously looking at a blank area and positioning
the eyes on a location congruent with the location of stimuli
during encoding facilitates retrieval. In fact, when participants
made different eye movements at the time of recall than
they had made at encoding they showed a decrease in their
ability to recall the visual scene (Laeng and Teodorescu,
2002).
It is important to note that participants in the verbal
description condition (Johansson et al., 2006) never saw a visual
stimulus, yet the overlap between eye movements at the time of
recall with those made at the time of encoding still predicted
recall performance. Why would this be so? Ferreira et al. (2008)
examined this ‘looking at nothing’ behavior, and suggested that
it reflects an integrated memory representation based on visual
and linguistic input. They proposed that reactivation of one part
of the representation results in the other parts being retrieved
as well. Thus, there is a feedback loop in which, for example,
the reactivation of a linguistic component of the memory can
cause the eyes to move to the location in which the item
originally appeared, and that returning the eyes to this location
can improve memory for other information associated with
that item, including any visual and conceptual information.
Looking at the location where a stimulus was presented, even
after it is no longer present, is a result of the integrated
representation, and facilitates retrieval of further information
from it.
It seems reasonable that if looking at a location that
was previously occupied by a visual stimulus can aid in the
recall of both visual and conceptual information, then looking
away from a still present stimulus, or from the place the
stimulus previously occupied, could serve the opposite purpose.
That is, looking at nothing could reduce the tendency to
perseverate on an idea, or reduce that information’s level of
activation and its ability to capture and maintain attention.
According to Ferreira et al. (2008) this would apply to both the
visual elements of the stimulus and any associated conceptual
information. This also suggests that longer fixations away from
a stimulus would predict better inhibition of retrieval and less
interference, whereas shorter fixations away and frequent returns
to the stimulus would predict poorer inhibition and greater
interference.
EYE MOVEMENTS AND ATTENTION
Some of the clearest evidence for the bidirectional connection
between eye movements and cognition comes from studies of
attention; the direction of a person’s gaze is generally a clear
(though not perfect) indication of where attention is directed.
When a person wants to attend to an object or spatial location
she/he moves her/his eyes so that she can fixate on the object or
location, and when a person’s eyes moves to an object or location
attention usually moves too.
Attention is central to perceptual and higher level cognitive
processes, and it plays a central role in creativity (Kounios and
Beeman, 2009, 2014). Though attention and eye movement are
not one and the same, they are tightly linked (Golberg and
Wurtz, 1972; Posner, 1980; Rizzolatti et al., 1987; Klein et al.,
1992; Hoffman and Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler et al., 1995;
Deubel and Schneider, 1996). The pre-motor theory of attention
(Rizzolatti et al., 1987) suggests a strict link between both overt
and covert orienting of attention and programming explicit
ocular movements. Given a limited capacity to process competing
external stimuli, attention selects, regulates, and maintains focus
on the information relevant for behavior while simultaneously
inhibiting processing of information that is also available, but
that is irrelevant. It seems likely that control of attention
has evolved out of the necessity to efficiently manage limited
cognitive processing capacity and focus it on the information
most relevant to ongoing goals and behaviors (Pashler et al.,
2001). Attention guides and controls how we move our eyes,
allowing us to handle the wealth of visual information provided
by the surrounding environment (Rayner, 2009; Schall and
Thompson, 1999). Multiple stimuli compete for selection, and the
goal of attention is to bias the competition to favor a target object
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995). Processing of a target object
would be facilitated by both enhancing activation of the target
and inhibiting distractors and noise. A very straightforward way
to inhibit processing of an irrelevant stimulus would be to look
away from it, close one’s eyes, or engage in increased blinking.
The pre-motor theory of attention (Rizzolatti et al., 1987)
suggests that eye movements and attentional shifts are driven
by the same internal mechanisms, and they are both managed
mostly by the superior colliculus (Golberg and Wurtz, 1972).
Chun et al. (2011), propose a taxonomy based on the types
of information that attention operates over (i.e., the target of
attention): Information coming in from the outside, through
the senses (external or bottom-up attention), and information
that already has an internal representation (internal or top–
down attention). External attention is driven by properties of
the outside world and involves the selection and modulation of
sensory information, in a modality-specific representation, and
often with tags for spatial locations and time (Chun et al., 2011).
These two types of attention share the same capacity limitations
and they are mutually exclusive. In other words, if attention to
internal thoughts is increased, attention to the external world will
decrease, and vice versa.
Several studies, using different behavioral and
neurophysiological measures and across different fields, e.g.,
problem solving (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006;
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Kounios and Beeman, 2009; Salvi et al., 2015), mind wandering
(Smallwood et al., 2007; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood et al.,
2011, 2013), have produced converging evidence demonstrating
that, when attention is focused internally processing of external
stimuli is suppressed. This mechanism would allow the
enhancement of internal concentration by reducing distractions.
As mentioned above, studies of gaze aversion have shown that
the frequency of ‘looking away’ increases with the difficulty of
cognitive processing, that it has a functional consequence on
memorization, and that closing the eyes improves accuracy for
questions of moderate difficulty (Glenberg et al., 1998). Analysis
of eye blink rates has shown a similar pattern. Blinking physically
blocks incoming information by the closing the eyelid, and
generates a suppression of vision associated with an inhibitory
signal sent out by the brain (Volkmann et al., 1980) both
before and after the time of actual lid closure (Stevenson et al.,
1986; Volkmann, 1986; Bristow et al., 2005a,b). But, blinking
is something more than a mere interruption of visual input,
it has been suggested that blinking is a sensory ending of a
top-down processes that allows or facilitates an internal and
more complex cognitive mechanism of attention (Salvi, 2013).
Specifically, directing attention internally has been found to
produce higher eye blink rates (Wood and Hassett, 1983).
According to Holland and Tarlow (1975), blinking occurs at the
moment of cognitive change as an indicant of transitions between
different gazes, sets, or ideas. Conversely, both blink rate and
blink duration decline as a function of more intense mental
workload (Brookings et al., 1996; Hankins and Wilson, 1998;
Veltman and Gaillard, 1998), task concentration, mental activity,
and when information in memory is being operated on (Telford
and Thompson, 1933)–such as solving arithmetic problems
(Holland and Tarlow, 1975). Blinking has been consistently found
to be associated with internal thought processes like insight
problem solving (Salvi et al., 2015), creativity and divergent
thinking (Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2010; Ueda et al.,
2015), mind wandering (Smilek et al., 2010), errors in vigilance
related to external stimuli (Van Orden et al., 2000; Papadelis et al.,
2007), and conflicts between internal and external workloads
(Recarte et al., 2008).
EYE MOVEMENTS, BLINKING, AND
MIND WANDERING
Our attention fluctuates over time between being internally and
externally focused (Smallwood et al., 2008a,b). Mind wandering
is a state of focus on internal information, where our attention
switches from the primary task to our private thoughts that
become the focus of awareness (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006).
This entails a state of processing decoupled from perception, and
a temporary failure in meta-awareness, i.e., the ability to self-
reflect upon the content a mental state (Schooler, 2002).
When looking for a creative idea, or the possible solution to a
problem, people often mind wander. Of course, mind wandering
does not necessarily imply that one is working on a problem or
having a creative idea, for example one could be thinking of a past
vacation. However, several lines of evidence converge to show
that mind wandering is related to both creativity (e.g., Baird et al.,
2012; Ritter and Dijksterhuis, 2014) and the ‘looking at nothing’
behavior mentioned before (Smilek et al., 2010).
Mind wandering has been associated with both internally
focused attention and with reduced cortical analysis of the
external environment (Smallwood et al., 2008a). Specifically,
when people try to engage attention in a sustained manner the
depth of cognitive analysis applied to the external environment
fluctuates. Reichle et al. (2010) established that a person’s fixation
pattern while reading is a reliable indicant of attentive or mindless
reading. Their results demonstrated that right before episodes
of mind wandering subjects were more likely to avoid the text,
looking somewhere else, and to elongate their fixations. This
study, demonstrates that mind wandering competes with the
processing of task-relevant information and reduces the cognitive
analysis of external events (e.g., Dehaene and Changeux, 2005;
Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). Smilek et al. (2010) showed that
an increased blinking rate is associated with mindless reading.
Their study demonstrated that mind wandering is coupled with
physical blocking of sensory information provided by closing the
eyes, suggesting that eye blinks can serve as an index of the degree
to which a person is attending to internal thoughts. Thus, the
evidence from the variety of studies discussed above supports the
position that eye movements and blinking can be used to infer
cognitive processes such as memory search and focus of attention.
EYE MOVEMENTS, BLINKING, AND
CREATIVITY
Problem solving often implies the construction of mental models
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). Mental models serve to both depict
the abstract relations between objects and events, and orient
attention toward information relevant for the mental model
(Smallwood et al., 2008b). Demarais and Cohen (1998) showed
that when reasoning, specifically during syllogisms containing
the words ‘left’ and ‘right’, participants make more horizontal eye
movements, and during syllogisms containing ‘above’ and ‘below’
participants make more vertical eye movements. Similarly, when
attempting to solve problems we often imagine the abstract
representation of the problem space and the elements that
make up the problem scenario. The creation of models can be
triggered in an automatic bottom–up manner (Gerrig, 2005) or
constructed in a more purposeful analytic, top–down manner
(Graesser et al., 1994), with most problem solving efforts
involving an interaction between the two.
Another way to conceptualize problem solving is to suggest
that people solve problems via heuristic search through a problem
space (Newell and Simon, 1972). In this space the various
pieces of information given in a problem and other previous
knowledge, which may have initially seemed unrelated, can
become linked together to reach a solution. One way to reach
a solution is to search the problem space by analysis, following
the most likely paths in a gradual approach toward solution
with awareness of the intervening steps (Metcalfe and Wiebe,
1987). Alternatively, a novel solution to a problem can suddenly
emerge into consciousness in what is called Insight or an ‘Aha!’
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moment. Insight is a form of creative problem solving that
appears to be distinct from analytic solutions because it relies
on the sudden reorganization of a mental representation of a
problem (Sternberg and Davidson, 1995), and it often seems
surprising to the solvers, who are typically unaware of how the
reorganization occurred, yet remain confident that the solution
fits the whole problem.
Cognitive neuroscience has begun to shed light on specific
components that underlie problem solving in general, and
the differences between creative and more analytic problem
solving styles. Neuroimaging reveals that, within a network
of neural substrates engaged during problem solving, distinct
areas are recruited or emphasized when people solve with
sudden insight compared to when they solve analytically (for
review: Kounios and Beeman, 2014). Much of this evidence at
least circumstantially suggests that distinct patterns of attention
(broad or narrow focus) differentiate the two types of solutions.
We suggest that evidence from eye movement recordings adds
significantly to this understanding.
The association between eye movements and thinking has
been demonstrated for some time. Early studies suggested that
the direction of eye movements indicates increased activation of
the contralateral cerebral hemisphere. Bakan (1969) found that
leftward eye movements in response to questions were associated
with clearer mental imagery and relatively poorer mathematical
performance on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). Harnad
(1972) found that among twenty participants the ten who
predominantly moved their eyes in a leftward direction had
higher RAT (Mednick and Mednick, 1967) scores and made more
extreme esthetic ratings than the right-movers. Kocel et al. (1972)
found that the direction of lateral eye movements was strongly
modified by the type of question, with verbal and arithmetical
questions eliciting more rightward eye movements than did
spatial and musical questions. Each of these studies suggests at
least a weak relationship between the tendency to look in one
direction and the level of performance on certain tasks that
would appear to require either more analytic or more creative
thinking. Hines and Martindale (1974) went a step further and
examined whether artificially induced right or left eye movements
facilitated intellectual and creative tasks, respectively. In two
experiments male left-lookers scored significantly higher than
male right-lookers on the RAT and Alternate Uses Test (AUT;
Guilford, 1967). However, in a third experiment female right-
lookers scored non-significantly higher than female left-lookers
on the RAT and AUT. Hines and Martindale concluded that the
effect of induced lateral eye movements was real but relatively
weak.
Recent research by Shobe et al. (2009) and Fleck and
Braun (2015) has continued to support the effect of lateral
eye movements on creativity. Shobe et al. (2009) investigated
the effects of increased inter-hemispheric interaction on five
dimensions of creativity (appropriateness, detail, flexibility,
fluency, and originality) of the AUT. They used a bilateral
eye movement task to directly manipulated inter-hemispheric
interaction. They found that bilateral eye movements increased
originality and flexibility of participants with a strongly dominant
hand, but had no effect on mixed-handers. Fleck and Braun
(2015) combined the visual-hemifield presentation technique
with eye movement tasks to investigate whether the bilateral
eye movement effect could be extended to a creativity task
similar to the RAT [the Compound Remote Associates (CRA)
Task; Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003]. They found that eye
movement conditions resulted in improved performance on
a solution-recognition task, with the bilateral eye movement
condition demonstrating the best performance for solution
targets.
Studies using the visual-hemifield presentation technique have
provided more specific data on how the hemispheres contribute
differentially to creativity. Two studies showed that participants
were faster to read, and recognize as solutions, solution words
presented to the left visual field, and thus initially the Right
Hemisphere (Bowden and Beeman, 1998; Jung-Beeman and
Bowden, 2000). This indicated that there was greater activation
of solution-relevant information in the right hemisphere than
in the left hemisphere. A further visual-hemifield study showed
that following unsolved problems participants showed greater
priming for solutions that they rated as evoking an insight
experience on the subsequent solution decision than for solutions
that did not evoke an insight experience. This association was
stronger for solutions presented to the left visual field-RH
than for those presented to the right visual field-LH. These
results tied the subjective experience of insight to an objective
measure—semantic priming—and suggested that people have
an Aha! experience in part because they already had semantic
activation that could lead them to recognize the solution
quickly (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2003). The evidence suggests
that semantic activation in both hemispheres cooperatively
contributes to problem solving, whereas weak solution activation
that contributes to the Aha! experience is more likely to occur
in the RH than in the LH. These studies were followed up by a
neuroimaging study combining fMRI and EEG, which revealed
increased activity in the right hemisphere anterior superior
temporal gyrus for insight solutions relative to non-insight
solutions (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). This area is associated with
making connections across distantly related information during
comprehension (Beeman et al., 2000). Thus, what was hinted at
by early studies of the relation between lateral eye movements
and activation of the hemispheres was ultimately fine tuned to
show that specific areas within each hemisphere play important
and distinct roles in problem solving.
Eye movements have also been used to test theories of
problem solving. For example, Knoblich et al. (2001) used
recording of eye movements to test the representational change
theory of insight. They predicted that when a person is at an
impasse that person should have fewer eye movements (longer
fixations) and that fixation patterns would reveal what parts
of the problem people consider relevant, so that the elements
of the problem that people fixated on would change following
constraint relaxation. They found that for successful problem
solvers, the percentage of fixation time spent on the element
that must be changed to reach a solution increased over time
and that the percentage of fixation time increased dramatically
in the time period immediately prior to solution. Their study
demonstrates the power of eye movement recordings to reveal
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facets of problem solving that would have remained hidden when
using more traditional performance measures like solution time
and solution rate.
Bilalic´ et al. (2008) were able use eye movement data to
reveal the mechanisms of Einstellung (cognitive set). They
demonstrated that once chess experts had found one solution
they continued to look at the squares related to their first
idea, even while reporting that they were looking for a better
idea. In other words, the fixations showed that chess experts
were continuing to allocate most of their attention to their first
idea even when they thought they were searching for other
possible moves. Ellis et al. (2011) and Ellis and Reingold (2014),
further investigated Einstellung by monitoring participants’
eye movements while they attempted to solve anagrams. The
anagrams were presented as six letters: a central three-letter string
whose letters were always part of the solution word, and three
additional individual letters one of which was a distractor letter
(not part of the solution word). Participants were asked to find a
five-letter solution word. The central letter string was presented
as either a nonword or as a three-letter word. The typical
Einstellung effect was found with better overall performance for
nonword than word trials, however, participants’ eye movements
revealed both interference and facilitation as a function of the
familiarity of the central letter string. Participants spent less time
looking at the central letters when they were presented as a word,
suggesting that a word was easier to encode and maintain in
memory a word than three individual letters. Participants also
spent more time viewing the individual letters when the central
letters were presented as a word, suggesting that they found it
more difficult to incorporate the individual letters into an existing
central word.
Not only can eye movements reveal underlying processes and
strategies, they can influence these processes and strategies. Based
on Grant and Spivey’s (2003) suggestion that there is an implicit
link between eye movements and cognition, Thomas and Lleras
(2009a) subtly guided the eye movements of some participants
as they attempted to solve Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem
(Duncker, 1945)–Given a human being with an inoperable
stomach tumor, and lasers which destroy organic tissue at sufficient
intensity, how can one cure the person with these lasers and, at
the same time, avoid harming the healthy tissue that surrounds
the tumor?1 Thomas and Lleras (2009a) found that using an
eye-tracking task to induce eye movements that embodied
the solution led to an increase in solution rates compared to
participants who were allowed to move their eyes freely. In
another study Thomas and Lleras (2009b), required participants
to either move their eyes, move their attention while holding
their eyes still, or keep both their eyes and attention fixated in
the center of the display. The results show that shifting attention
in a pattern that expressed the problem’s solution increased
the probability of solving the problem even in the absence eye
movements. Therefore, it is not the eye movements themselves
that lead to the solution; rather it is the effect the eye movements
have on attention that is important.
1The correct solution to this problem involves firing multiple low-intensity lasers
from different locations around the tumor so that they converge at the tumor.
Thomas (2013) also manipulated eye movements while
participants attempted to solve a problem, and simultaneously
performed a verbal or spatial working memory task. Participants
who moved their eyes in a pattern that embodied the solution
were more likely to solve the problem than participants who
maintained fixation, however, this was only true for participants
who performed the verbal working memory task. Since the
solution to the radiation problem relies largely on spatial
information, loading spatial working memory prevented the eye
movement manipulation from improving problem solving. In
contrast, when paired with the verbal memory task the eye
movement manipulation improved solving performance just as
in the earlier studies.
Of course, to influence solution rates by directing eye
movements it would seem that one has to know what the
solution is. However, Werner and Raab (2014, p. 1572) advance
the argument that ‘it is not the movement per se but the goal
of the movement that is causal for the effect of sensorimotor
information on cognitive processes’ (Raab and Green, 2005;
Engel et al., 2013). Therefore, influencing eye movements,
and blink rates, might also work at a level more general
or abstract than the specific solution by influencing attention
and memory retrieval. Eye movements to, and fixations on, a
stimulus can serve to focus attention on that external stimuli
and facilitate the retrieval of further information from it,
whereas eye movements away from the stimulus, and fixations
on empty space, can serve to shift attention away from
external stimuli, inhibiting further processing, and allowing
weaker (more distantly related) internal information to come to
the fore.
In a study using CRA problems Jung-Beeman et al. (2004)
strongly discouraged (so as not to get eye movement artifacts
in EEG data) this tendency to look away or blink. They found
that EEG revealed a sudden increase in alpha-frequency activity
over the right occipital-parietal cortex 1.5 s prior to insight
solutions, but not prior to analytic solutions. Alpha activity over
sensory cortex is thought to indicate active suppression of input
(Haegens et al., 2011; Händel et al., 2011; Ben-Simon et al., 2013)
so this increase in alpha under the condition of restriction in
eye movements and blinking was interpreted as a covert effort
to reduce the amount of visual information passed from visual
areas to higher areas that perform more abstract computation
(Kounios and Beeman, 2009; Payne and Kounios, 2009). In other
words, this alpha burst was interpreted as attention shifting away
from the visual representation of the problem, toward internal
processing (Benedek et al., 2014) just prior to insight but not
solutions by analysis.
Results from an fMRI study of problem solving indicate
that during the rest period prior to presentation of visual
problems stronger activity in dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex
(dACC) is associated with subsequently solving by insight,
whereas stronger activity in visual cortex is associated with
subsequently solving by analysis (Kounios et al., 2006). The
ACC is a critical hub in the network subserving cognitive
control (Posner and DiGirolamo, 1998; Kerns et al., 2004), the
process by which the brain guides and controls processing,
and plays a pivotal role in attention shifting (Kondo et al.,
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2004). The greater neural activity found over the visual cortex–
prior to problems solved analytically-suggested that participants
are pre-oriented to elaborate visual information thus more
prone to direct their attention outwardly (Kounios et al., 2006;
Kounios and Beeman, 2009). This perspective is consistent
with the more general idea that creative thinkers have the
ability to change cognitive states between defocused and focused
attention (Martindale, 1995), strategically inhibit peripheral
information when necessary (Stavridou and Furnham, 1996),
and allocate attention in a diffuse manner (Dykes and McGhie,
1976). Wood and Hassett (1983) have shown that internally
directed attention yields higher blink rates during problem
solving and Tsubota et al. (1999) demonstrated that the visual
cortex activation is greater with voluntary blink inhibition.
Thus, solving by insight is associated with directing attention
toward cognitive control – perhaps enhancing the ability to
shift processing from one idea to another – whereas solving
by analysis is associated with a readiness to process visual
information. This latter conclusion has been demonstrated by
measuring eye movements when people have insights. In a
study paralleling the neuroimaging and EEG work, Salvi et al.
(2015) monitored overt attention, before and while people solved
word problems, through three different measures: blinking,
fixation frequency, and fixation location. The results suggest
that solutions via insight are facilitated by actively reducing
potentially interfering visual inputs, by blinking more before
and during problem solving, and avoiding visual distractors
by looking in the white space outside of the problem area
just prior to solving. These results directly demonstrate that
people overtly direct their attention differently when solving
a set of CRA problems by insight versus solving by analysis.
Decreased blinking and increased number of fixations show
that externally focused attention, on the problem itself or
the space where the problem will appear, is more conducive
to solving problems with analysis. Increased blinking and
decreased eye movements, as well as increased fixations on
empty space, indicate that internally focused attention on
associations generated by the problem, is more conducive to
solving with sudden insight. This pattern of blinking, fixations,
and eye movements–which indicate disengaging from the
visual stimuli–appear to enhance imagination and creativity by
diminishing processing of inputs and their strong associations,
and switching attention inwardly to allow detection of weaker
associations.
Ueda et al. (2015) also found that blinking could have
an effect on creativity. Analyses of eye blinks during
creative performance indicated that increased eye blink
rates corresponded with the production of more alternative
uses on the AUT and slower solutions on the RAT. They
suggest that the slower RAT solutions reflect a more divergent
search for solution candidates, an interpretation that would
be consistent with increased eye blinks being related to using
an insight approach to solve RAT problems. The results
are compatible with the suggestion that spontaneous eye
blinks are actively involved in attentional disengagement
from the external world allowing more divergent thinking to
occur.
A THIRD VARIABLE INTERPRETATION
OF EYE-MOVEMENTS, BLINKING, AND
CREATIVITY
As we have discussed above, there is a fair amount of evidence
that eye movements and blinking reflect basic cognitive processes
such as memory search (e.g., Ehrlichman and Weinberger, 1978;
Ehrlichman and Barrett, 1983; Bergstrom and Hiscock, 1988;
Glenberg et al., 1998; Laeng and Teodorescu, 2002; Ferreira et al.,
2008; Ehrlichman and Micic, 2012; Johansson and Johansson,
2014) and attention (e.g., Golberg and Wurtz, 1972; Posner,
1980; Rizzolatti et al., 1987; Klein et al., 1992; Hoffman and
Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler et al., 1995; Deubel and Schneider,
1996; Salvi et al., 2015), and can be used to infer these cognitive
processes with a reasonable degree of accuracy (Henderson et al.,
2013). There is also evidence (though less) that eye movements
and blinking can affect, as well as reveal, cognitive processes
(e.g., Shobe et al., 2009; Thomas and Lleras, 2009a,b; Thomas,
2013; Fleck and Braun, 2015). However, a third possibility that
we have not discussed is that eye movements and blinking,
and cognitive processes such as divergent thinking and ability
to focus attention are all affected by a third variable. One
possible candidate for the third variable is a person’s level of
dopamine.
Spontaneous blink rates have been linked to dopamine
function (DA; Karson, 1983; Blin et al., 1990; Kleven and
Koek, 1996; Taylor et al., 1999; Colzato et al., 2007, 2009)
and spontaneous eye blink rate is used as an index of striatal
dopamine production (Karson, 1983; Shukla, 1985; Taylor
et al., 1999). DA, in turn, is highly associated with executive
function, and anatomically with the dACC that contributes
to these processes. Increasing dopamine levels or activity via
lesions or pharmacology, increases blink rates; conversely,
decreasing dopamine decreases blink rates (Karson, 1983; Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel, 2010).
Dopamine functioning is associated with attention/cognitive
control and with the degree to which people maintain ongoing
processes or switch to new processes (Müller et al., 2007). This
kind of cognitive flexibility, important for generating new ideas,
depends on dopamine D2 receptor signaling (Van Holstein et al.,
2011).
Specifically, there are a number of reasons to believe that
dopamine plays an important role in creativity. Eysenck (1993)
has related aspects of creativity to schizophrenia, and pointed
out that schizophrenics and healthy creative individuals share
a certain lack of constraints and inhibition in their thinking.
Ashby et al. (1999) attempting to explain the beneficial effect
of mood on creative behavior assume that higher DA levels
are associated with less inhibition of alternative thoughts and
greater cognitive flexibility (cf., Cohen and Servan-Schreiber,
1992).
Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2010) measured EBR in
the resting periods before and after participants performed
both a divergent thinking task (the Alternative Uses Task –
of Guilford, 1967) and convergent thinking one (the Remote
Associate Task – RAT, Mednick, 1962). For the AUT, participants
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who produce moderate levels of spontaneous eye blinks perform
better than those with higher or lower levels. Conversely, the
researchers found a weak, negative relationship between EBR
and RAT accuracy. Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2010)
provided evidence regarding the relationship between creativity
and spontaneous eye blinks at rest and their results strengthen the
claim that creativity and the dopamine system are related. Thus,
both EBRs and convergent and divergent thinking might be the
result of different levels of dopamine.
One difficulty with reaching conclusions regarding the
relation between dopamine and creativity by using the AUT
and RAT (or CRAs) is that the AUT is a relatively pure
measure of divergent thinking (with four components originality,
fluency, flexibly, and elaboration) while the RAT requires a
combination of divergent and convergent thinking. Both the
RAT and CRA require that solvers generate many possible
words that are related (or form compounds with) the words
in the triads, which is a divergent component of the task.
Solvers must then be sensitive to the overlap between the
many words generated, which is a convergent component of
the task, to be able to select the one correct answer. Studies
have often focused only on solution rates, used few problems,
and given relatively long solution periods, possibly obscuring
some subtle changes in EBR or eye movement and fixation
patterns.
As mentioned above, Ueda et al. (2015) also found that
blinking could have an effect on creativity. They found essentially
the same relation between ERB and AUT as reported by Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel (2010), however, they examined
solution speed as well as solution rate for RAT problems and
found that participants with higher resting EBRs took longer to
solve RAT problems. They suggest that the slower RAT solutions
reflect a more divergent search for solution candidates. They also
found no correlation between number solved and EBR during
the task suggesting at least the possibility that solution rate is
too coarse a measure to be used in studies of the components of
creative problem solving.
Salvi et al. (2015) divided solutions to the CRAs into
those produced via insight or via analysis (as self-reported by
participants) and found that the number of blinks was greater
for problems solved with insight than for problems solved with
analysis. These results demonstrate that people overtly direct
their attention differently when solving a set of CRA problems
by insight versus solving by analysis.
Dopamine level has also been found to correlate with creativity
in a neuroimaging study (de Manzano et al., 2010). de Manzano
et al. (2010) found that scores on divergent thinking tests
(Inventiveness battery, Berliner Intelligenz Struktur Test) were
correlated with regional D2 receptor densities, as measured by
Positron Emission Tomography. The results showed a negative
correlation between D2 density in the thalamus and divergent
thinking scores, demonstrating that the D2 receptor system is
important for creative performance.
Several researchers have examined the emergence of artistic or
creative behaviors in people with Parkinson’s Disease (PD) who
are undergoing treatment with levodopa or dopamine agonists
(Canesi et al., 2012; Inzelberg, 2013).
By examining creative and non-creative PD patients
Lhommée et al. (2014) found that creativity decreased
significantly following reduction in dopaminergic treatment
leading to the conclusion that creativity is at least partly
dependent on dopamine. High dopamine levels may
disrupt latent inhibition (which is the capacity of the
brain to filter seemingly irrelevant stimuli from conscious
awareness; Chakravarty, 2010) via alterations in the
mesolimbic and mesocortical dopaminergic pathways, which
are involved in the modulation of reward, motivation,
inhibitory control, and decision-making (Kulisevsky
et al., 2009). Reduced latent inhibition is thought to
be a biological basis of creativity, therefore, the general
hypothesis is that dopaminergic drugs may reduce
inhibitory control through the stimulation of these pathways
(Antonini and Cilia, 2009), possibly leading to greater
creativity.
It is worth mentioning that PD is associated with some
problems in visual processing and ocular-motor control
(Armstrong, 2011). Some of these symptoms, such as hypometria
of saccades, which is related to poor visual memory (Hodgson
et al., 1999; Shaunak et al., 1999), are related to dopamine
deficiency, while others such as visual hallucinations and
prolonged latency of saccades are related to treatment with
dopamine agonists (Michell et al., 2006).
CONCLUSION
Where do we look when we look for a creative idea? The
evidence suggests that we ‘look nowhere’ and we blink. That
is, looking at nothing, or the ‘blank wall behavior’ and
increased blinking, has been found to be associated with insight,
but not analytic solutions on RAT and CRA problems, and
increased creativity on various measures of creativity such as
the AUT, and better performance on mental imagery tasks.
This looking nowhere behavior, as well as increases in blink
rate, has also been observed during memory encoding and
search, changes in attentional focus, and mind wandering–all
forms of cognition that do not explicitly involve visual imagery.
The research has demonstrated that ‘looking at nothing’ and
blinking are associated with reduced analysis of the external
visual environment. Thus, looking nowhere appears to indicate
(and likely facilitate) a shift of attention from external to
internal stimuli, which benefits creativity and problem solving by
reducing the cognitive load and enhancing attention to internally
evolving activation.
In this paper we have made a case for using eye movement
patterns, fixations, and blink rates to study creativity and
problem solving. We suggest that these data can reveal
strategies people employ, and how memory search and
allocation of attention differ for different types of problem
solving. We also suggest that manipulating eye movements
might induce attentional states that are more conducive to
either analytic or insight problem solving. Eye movements
can also be used to reveal what stage a person is at in
the problem solving process. For example, eye movements
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could reveal when a person has reached an impasse and would be
most receptive to information that could lead to a change in the
representation of the problem, or when a period of incubation
might be most effective in the problem solving process.
Finally, we would argue that even if eye movements, blink
rates, and fixations are epiphenomena of creativity, or driven
by differences in dopamine levels, the fact that they are
correlated with different types of cognitive processes suggests that
monitoring them during problem solving activities would still
provide very useful information.
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